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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, the United States Congress enacted a revised version of 
section 1782 of Title 28 of the United States Code, entitled "Assistance 
to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribu-
nals."1 This revision had been prepared by the Columbia Law School 
Project on International Procedure, of which I was the Director, and the 
U.S. Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of 
Judicial Procedure, to which I functioned as the Reporter.2 It was part of 
an overall revision of American rules for obtaining and giving of assist-
ance to litigants involved in international adjudication undertaken by the 
Columbia Project and the U.S. Commission and Advisory Committee.3 
The 1964 revision of Section 1782 was a drastic one. It substituted 
one succinct section for a number of sections in the United States Code 
that had rarely found practical application.4 The revised section 1782 
greatly liberalized assistance given to foreign and international litigants 
and tribunals and, in the thirty-five years that followed its enactment, 
has been applied in scores of cases.5 All too frequently, the develop-
* Copyright by Hans Smit, Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
1. 28 u.s.c. § 1782 (1996). 
2. On the co-operation between the Project and the Commission, see Hans Smit, Assistance 
Rendered by the United States in Proceedings Before International Tribunals, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1264-65, n.7 [hereinafter Smit, Assistance]. 
3. On the work of the Project and Commission generally, see INTERNATIONAL Co-OPERA-
TION IN LITIGATION: EuROPE, col. 1 (Hans Smit, ed., The Hague, 1965). 
4. On the precursors of § 1782, see Smit, Assistance, supra note 2, at 1264; Hans Smit, 
International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1026-35 
(1965)[hereinafter Smit, International Litigation]. 
5. For commentatorial treatment of these cases, see Hans Smit, Recent Developments in In-
ternational Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 215 (1994) [hereinafter Smit, Recent Developments]; 
LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & MICHAEL BURROWS, THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 
251 (1993); Robert H. Smit, The Sarrio Decision, 12 IBA C1v. Lma. NEWSL. No. 5 (1996); Peter 
D. Troobof & Bradford L. Smith, Judicial Assistance - Foreign Criminal Investigations. Evidence 
"For Use in a Proceeding", 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 929 (1989); Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 
U.S.C. Section I782 For Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 597 (1990); 
Edward C. Weiner, In Search of International Evidence: A Lawyer's Guide Through the United 
States Department of Justice, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 60 (1982); Brian E. Bornstein & Julie M. 
Levitt, Much Ado About I782; A Look at Present Problems in the Discovery in the United States 
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ment of considerable case law bears testimony to deficiencies in statu-
tory text. But, as I hope to demonstrate, that is not the case here. The 
statutory text is straightforward and clear. The case law it has spawned 
has been caused by judicial unwillingness to give it the meaning that an 
unbiased reading requires. The reasons for this unwillingness have not 
always been clearly expressed. They include a reluctance to add to the 
burdens of already overtaxed courts,6 a lack of understanding of adjudi-
catory processes in foreign and international tribunals, 7 and, in some 
measure, a distrust of those processes. 8 
Now that thirty-five years have passed, it seems appropriate that we 
evaluate in greater detail the developments under a provision that has led 
to a good deal of litigation and evoked widespread comment. 9 
It is a fortuitous circumstance that this time span of thirty-five years 
is the same in which I have had the great pleasure and privilege of col-
laborating with Peter Herzog, to which this article, and the issue in 
which it appears, are dedicated. When, in 1960, I returned to Columbia 
to direct the Project on International Procedure, Peter had just completed 
his work towards a Master's Degree under the direction of W .L.M. 
Reese, the Reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
and one of this nation's greatest scholars and teachers, who had also 
been my mentor. When I was asked to direct the Project, I thought that 
what we then called "international judicial assistance" was too limited a 
subject and that the Project should undertake comparative studies of se-
lected foreign systems of civil procedure. In the first instance, we se-
lected French, Italian, and Swedish procedures as suitable for 
comparative treatment. Professor Reese, who described Peter as one of 
the brightest men he knew, urged that we seek to persuade him to take 
for Use in Foreign Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 429 
(1989); Eileen P. McCarthy, A Proposed Litigation Standard for U.S. Courts in Granting Requests 
for International Judicial Assistance, 15 FORDHAM lNT'L L. J. 772 (1992). 
6. See Judge Feinberg in Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Technologies, Inc., 964 F. 2d 
97 105 (2d Cir. 1992) (dissenting in the case by noting that the liberal assistance sought would 
unduly add to the burdens of already overtaxed courts). 
7. Civil law courts generally do not provide for American-style discovery and do not rule on 
admissibility of evidence, particularly documentary evidence, at the time it is submitted. Further-
more, foreign procedural systems permit recourse to other ways of inducing a party or witness to 
produce the evidence. See Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 236-37, n. 96. 
8. This may have played a role in Judge Friendly's decision in In The Matter of Letters 
Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 
1967). See also text accompanying notes 21-22 infra. 
9. See supra note 5. 
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on the French system and, in due course, Peter produced his opus 
magni.ficum, entitled "Civil Procedure in France."10 
When the work on the Columbia Project on International Procedure 
had been completed, we organized a Project on European Legal Institu-
tions under a Ford Foundation grant. Again, we turned to Peter to seek 
his collaboration on a multi-volume work on the European Economic 
Community that bears his and my name. 11 
Having worked with Peter on projects in the areas of international 
law and international procedure, it would appear appropriate that I deal, 
in a volume dedicated to him, with a subject that has always remained 
the focus of his intellectual and academic endeavors: the interaction of 
laws on the multi-state level. 12 
II. THE PRECURSOR OF SECTION 1782 AND ITs PRESENT VERSION 
The present version of Section 1782 deals in one section with what 
had previously been the subjects of separate treatments: The assistance 
to international tribunals had been addressed in Sections 270 through 
270C of the Title 22 of the United States Code, 13 while that rendered for 
foreign courts and litigants had been covered by Sections 1782 and 1785 
of Table 20 of the United States Code. 14 The 1964 Revision deals with 
both types of assistance in one encompassing section. As may become 
clear, this amalgamation does have a bearing on the proper construction 
of new Section 1782.15 
I will not deal here with the details of the changes that new Section 
1782 brought. They have been described in earlier publications. 16 In the 
following, primary consideration will be given to the constructions given 
to Section 1782 by the courts. My conclusion will be that, on the whole, 
Section 1782 has served its intended purpose, that, on occasion, some 
courts have given it a construction that is at odds with both its clear text 
and evident purpose, but that it is reasonable to expect that, over time, 
10. PETER HERZOG, CTvIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE (with Martha Weser, 1967). It remains the 
only work in English on the subject. In the same series, the Project published MAURO CAPPEL-
LETII & JoSEPH PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965); RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS 
BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE TN SWEDEN (1965); TAKAAKI HATIORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (1983, loose-leaf). 
11. HANS SMIT & PETER HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
(loose-leaf, 7 volumes). 
12. For many years, Peter published his annual reviews of decisions by New York courts in 
conflict of laws cases, which rank among the best publications in the area. 
13. On these sections, see Smit, Assistance, supra note 2, at 1264. 
14. On the precursors of§ 1782, see Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at 1026-35. 
15. See the text accompanying notes 18-26 infra. 
16. See Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at I.e. 
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the courts and commentators will fall into line and will apply Section 
1782 in a manner consistent with its purpose of facilitating the conduct 
of litigation with international aspects. 
III. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF SECTION 1782 
Section 1782 provides: 
Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants 
before such tribunals 
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is 
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a 
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or interna-
tional tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before for-
mal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory 
issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon 
the application of any interested person and may direct that the testi-
mony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be pro-
duced, before appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the 
person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath an take 
the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and 
procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of 
the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony 
or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent 
that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement 
shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement 
or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally ap-
plicable privilege. 
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United 
States from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing 
a document or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or inter-
national tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to 
him. 
The elements that deserve more detailed consideration are the 
following: 
( 1) on behalf of which tribunals and litigants may the evidence be 
sought; 
(2) when is assistance to be rendered to arbitral tribunals; 
(3) to which persons may the court's order be addressed; 
(4) must the evidence be located in the United States; 
(5) what is the relevance of foreign rules of evidence; 
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(6) what must be the intended use of the evidence; 
(7) how should the court exercise its discretion; 
(8) what is the procedure under Section 1782; 
(9) what are the applicable privileges; 
(10) what is the significance of Subsection (b); 
(11) what is the relation to The Hague Evidence Convention? 
IV. THE TRIBUNALS AND LITIGANTS TO WHICH ASSISTANCE MAY 
BE GRANTED 
5 
The precursor of Section 1782 provided for the taking of a deposi-
tion "to be used in any judicial proceeding pending in any court." 17 
Under that version, the assistance to be rendered therefore had to be in 
aid of a judicial proceeding in a court. However, the present version of 
Section 1782 provides for assistance for use in "a foreign or interna-
tional tribunal." The substitution of the word "tribunal" for "court" was 
deliberate, for the drafters wanted to make the assistance provided for 
available to all bodies with adjudicatory functions. 18 Clearly, private 
arbitral tribunals come within the term the drafters used. 19 This is also 
confirmed by the legislative history. New Section 1782 was expanded 
also to cover the assistance provided for in Sections 270-270C of Table 
22 of the United States Code. This assistance was available to interna-
tional tribunals established pursuant to an international agreement to 
which the United States was a party. Clearly those tribunals included 
international arbitral tribunals. Indeed, sections 270-270C of 22 United 
States Code were enacted especially for the purpose of providing for 
assistance to an international arbitral tribunal. 20 New Section 1782 not 
only intended to continue the provision for this assistance, but elimi-
nated the requirement that the international tribunals be established by 
agreement to which the United States is a party. Indeed, the broad term 
"international tribunal" was intended to cover all international arbitral 
tribunals. 
Notwithstanding this fulsome support for giving a broad reading to 
the term "tribunal" as it appears in Section 1782, some courts have 
failed to do so. In In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of 
17. See id. at 1026-27, n.72. 
18. See id. at 1021, n.36. 
19. Accord Smit, Assistance, supra note 2, at 1264. 
20. Id. 
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Inspection of the Government of India,21 Judge Friendly, writing for the 
Second Circuit, ruled that Section 1782 could not be used to obtain evi-
dence for use in an Indian proceeding to fix a tax assessment that could 
be appealed to appellate tribunals.22 More recently, Judges Duffy and 
Sweet, of the Southern District, have ruled that the term "tribunal" does 
not include an international arbitral tribunal. 23 These decisions are most 
regrettable. They run counter not only to the plain meaning of the term, 
to Section's 1782 legislative history, and to the clear purpose of that 
Section to facilitate evidence gathering in foreign and international 
adjudication. 
As will be explained below, special caution is appropriate in regard 
to requests for assistance in adjudication by arbitral tribunals, but that is 
because of the special concern courts should show for not interfering 
with the arbitral process.24 In the case decided by Judge Duffy, how-
ever, it was the arbitrator who requested assistance. Compliance with 
the request would therefore further, rather than frustrate, the arbitral pro-
cess. Judge Duffy's decision not only does not take this circumstance 
into account, but also fails to consider the desirability of promoting in-
ternational arbitration by extending to international arbitral tribunals the 
same assistance that is granted to other international tribunals. Leading 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, like those in Scherck25 and Mit-
subishi, 26 leave no doubt that international arbitration is a specially fa-
vored institution. The decisions by Judges Duffy and Sweet fail to give 
consequence to this judicially pronounced favor. On the contrary, they 
put international arbitral tribunals in a disfavored position. 
While the term "tribunal" in Section 1782 includes an arbitral tribu-
nal created by private agreement, 27 another question is what tribunals are 
"international" within the sense of Section 1782. Judge Duffy, in his 
Medway opinion,28 advanced the argument that, if Section 1782 were 
construed to reach privately formed international arbitral tribunals, it 
21. In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the Government of India, 
385 F. 2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967). 
22. On this case, see also Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 233. 
23. In re Medway Power Ltd., 1997 U.S. District LEXIS 18553 (Judge Kevan T. Duffy, 
S.D.N.Y., Nov. 20, 1997); In re National Broadcasting Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385 (Judge 
Robert Sweet, S.D.N.Y., Jan. 16, 1998). 
24. See text accompanying notes 32-41 infra. 
25. Scherk v. Alberta-Culver Company, 417 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 41 L. Ed. 2d 170 
(1974). 
26. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. 
Ct. 3346, 7 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985). On this decision, see Hans Smit, Mitsubishi: It's Not What It 
Seems To Be, 4 J. INT. ARB. 7 (1987) 
27. See text at notes 18-26 infra. 
28. In re Medway Power Ltd., 1997 U.S. District LEXIS 18553. 
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would provide for assistance to foreign arbitrations that is not extended 
to domestic arbitrations and that that would be improper. This argument 
fails for a variety of reasons. 
First, Section 1782 seeks to deal only with assistance to foreign and 
international tribunals, not with assistance to purely domestic tribunals. 
The latter subject lay without the purview of the task assigned to the 
Commission and the Columbia Project. Indeed, when I prepared the 
revision to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the Com-
mission and the Project relating to service of judicial documents abroad 
and provided for service by a non-party over eighteen years of age, 29 I 
was firmly convinced that a provision to that effect would also be most 
desirable in the domestic context. I decided, however, that proposal of a 
provision to that effect would carry us beyond our bailiwick and that, if 
our proposal would work well in the international context, it would in 
due course also be adopted in the domestic context. Our expectation in 
that regard proved to be well-founded, and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure now provide for such service across the board. 30 
I similarly believe that the assistance provided to international and 
foreign tribunals should also be extended to domestic tribunals and that, 
if it is not, it should be.31 But the possible absence of desirable assist-
ance to domestic arbitration tribunals may not reasonably be used as an 
argument for giving an unduly narrow construction to a statutory provi-
sion that, on its face, does grant such assistance to international arbitral 
tribunals. 
Second, Section 1782 is not, as Judge Duffy erroneously assumes, 
limited to foreign, as distinguished from domestic, arbitrations. It pro-
vides for assistance to an "international tribunal". An international arbi-
tral tribunal may also conduct its business in the United States. When it 
does, recourse to Section 1782 is available to it. Of course, this raises 
the question of what renders a tribunal international in the sense of Sec-
tion 1782. In line with the purpose of Section 1782 to provide broad and 
liberal assistance, the term "international" should be given the broadest 
possible construction. Accordingly, a tribunal is international in the 
sense of Section 1782 when any of the parties before it, or any of the 
arbitrators, is not a citizen or resident of the United States. Similarly, a 
tribunal should be regarded as foreign within the purview of Section 
29. On the 1963 revision of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see INTERNA-
TIONAL Co-OPERATION IN LITIGATION: EUROPE, supra note 3, at 10-11 (Nijhoff, 1965). 
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (i). 
31. Section 1782 does extend to international arbitral tribunals sitting in the United States. 
See text following this footnote. In purely domestic cases, courts may well be argued to possess 
inherent power to issue subpoenas in aid of arbitral tribunals sitting in sister states. 
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1782 when it is held anywhere outside the United States or is created 
under the law of a foreign country. 
v. WHEN ASSISTANCE TO ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS IS TO BE RENDERED 
As stated above, Section 1782 does apply to international arbitral 
tribunals created by private agreement.32 But this does not mean that 
assistance to international arbitral tribunals should be provided in the 
same circumstances in which it is extended to foreign courts. The pur-
pose of Section 1782 is to provide liberal assistance to foreign and inter-
national tribunals, but this assistance should not be provided when it 
would interfere with the orderly processes of the foreign or international 
tribunal. This, of course, raises a question of foreign law that, in the 
generality of cases, should be left for the foreign or international tribunal 
to decide. 33 The reason for this is that an application under Section 1782 
should not burden the American court with the ordinarily difficult task 
of determining the relevant foreign law. Recourse to Section 1782 
should be left as simple as possible in order to keep the provision of 
assistance to foreign and international speedy and efficient. The Ameri-
can court should refrain from passing on questions of foreign law34 
when these can quite properly be left to the foreign or international tri-
bunal which is necessarily the ultimate judge of whether the evidence 
can properly be used in its own forum. 35 And it may also safely be 
assumed that a litigant before a foreign or international tribunal will 
carefully consider whether it will be able to use the evidence in the for-
eign or international tribunal before it expends the effort and expense 
involved in seeking evidence pursuant to Section 1782. 
These considerations do not apply with the same force to interna-
tional arbitral tribunals. One of the great advantages of arbitration is 
that it leaves a great deal of freedom to the tribunal and the litigants to 
tailor the procedure to the needs of the particular case. This procedure 
will normally not be known before the tribunal and the litigants have had 
an opportunity to lay down the particular procedure they wish to be fol-
lowed. The parties can therefore not make any judgment as to whether 
recourse to Section 1782 would be compatible with the tribunal's proce-
dure. And once the tribunal has determined what procedure is to be 
followed, the parties can easily address the tribunal with the request that 
32. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra. 
33. See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra. 
34. For a more detail justification for this judicial abstention, see Smit, Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 5, at 235-36. 
35. See Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at Le. 
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it approve of a proposed application under Section 1782. Accordingly, 
the rule in relation to international arbitral tribunals should be that 
American court should honor an application under Section 1782 only if 
the application is approved by the arbitral tribunal. Judge Griesa, in an 
admirably reasoned decision, so ruled in In re Technostroyexport,36 in 
which he also properly stressed that the parties, by agreeing to arbitra-
tion, had agreed to abide by the arbitrator's rules. 
A different result was reached by Judges Duffy and Sweet, 37 who 
ruled that private arbitral tribunals were not covered by Section 1782 at 
all. 38 The result reached by Judge Sweet is compatible with the analysis 
defended here, since in the case he adjudicated the arbitral tribunal had 
not approved the application. 39 The same is not true of the application 
addressed to Judge Duffy, which had been made upon a ruling by the 
arbitrator that "directed that GE's documents are relevant and necessary 
for the fair determination of the dispute."40 As already indicated, Judge 
Duffy's ruling disregards the plain text, the legislative history, and the 
evident purpose of Section 1782.41 
VI. PERSONS REACHED BY SECTION 1782 
Section 1782 provides for a district court of a district "in which a 
person resides or is found" to order the production of evidence for use in 
a foreign or international tribunal. Thus far, the precise meaning of the 
quoted terms has not occasioned controversy. But, in a future case, a 
person addressed by an order to produce evidence may raise the question 
of whether it is subject to the district court's authority. The answer to 
that question is not immediately clear. There are no generally prevailing 
rules of in personam competence to which Section 1782 might be ar-
gued to refer. The quoted language must therefore be given its own 
meaning. 
The purpose of Section 1782 is to liberalize the assistance given to 
foreign and international tribunals.42 The language defining its in per-
sonam reach must therefore be given a liberal construction commensu-
rate with that purpose. This means that a person should be regarded as 
36. An opinion to that effect by the author was submitted in the NBC case. In re National 
Broadcasting Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385. 
37. In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y.1994). 
38. See cases cited supra note 23. 
39. In the Medway case, I had provided an opinion to the effect that the application should be 
denied on that ground. 
40. Medway, 1997 U.S. District LEXIS 18553, at *3. 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22. 
42. Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at 1026-27. 
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residing in the district not only when it is domiciled there, but also when 
it is resident there in the sense of residing in the district for some not 
insignificant period of time. Indeed, if the relationship of the person 
addressed to the district is such as to warrant the exercise of in personam 
authority under the due process clause, it should be regarded as "resi-
dent" there. 43 
The same is true of the term "found." The evident statutory pur-
pose is to create adjudicatory authority based on presence.44 Insofar as 
the term applies to legal rather than natural persons, it may safely be 
regarded as referring to judicial precedents that equate systematic and 
continuous local activities with presence.45 
VIL THE LocA TION OF THE EVIDENCE 
The question has arisen whether Section 1782 can be used to com-
pel production of tangible evidence located outside the district and, more 
particularly, in a foreign country and to compel testimony by witnesses 
outside of the district or in a foreign country. Section 1782 does not 
address this question in explicit terms. However, by creating adjudica-
tory authority over persons who may possess tangible evidence abroad46, 
Section 1782 might be argued to provided a statutory basis for produc-
tion of evidence located abroad. 
The issue arose in In re Sarrio S.A., involving an action before a 
Spanish court between Spanish parties, in which the plaintiff sought an 
order in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York 
to compel Bank America and "its direct and indirect subsidiaries and 
43. The United States Code, after its 1948 revision, speaks of "residence" and "reside.nts" 
whenever the pertinent criterion is either domicile or residence. The revision of § 1783 and 1784 
of Title 28 added residence as a basis for in personam adjudicatory authority on the assumption 
that the courts would exercise in personam adjudicatory authority whenever the physical relation-
ship to the United States of the person subpoenaed was such as to render it constitutional to 
exercise such authority over him or her. 
44. But mere transient presence is not sufficient. Whatever one may think of the propriety of 
using transient presence as a basis for in personam adjudicatory authority in an ordinary action to 
recover on a personal obligation. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 110 
S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631, (U.S. Cal., May 29, 1990) (NO. 89-44) mere transient presence is 
not a reasonable basis for exercising adjudicatory authority on behalf of a foreign and interna-
tional tribunal. 
45. For such cases, see MAURICE ROSENBERG, ET AL, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 255-
57 (5th ed. 1990) 
46. Persons resident or found within the United States may have in their possession or under 
their control evidence located abroad. It has long been recognized that such persons may be 
required to produce such evidence in actions in courts in the United States. See, e.g., Societe 
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court of Southern District Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 
107 S. Ct. 2542, 96 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1987); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F. 2d 97 
(2d Cir. 1968) 
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affiliates" to produce documents, and testimony by witnesses, located in 
Spain and Great Britian.47 
The drafters of Section 1782 did not anticipate recourse to Section 
1782 for this purpose. Furthermore, there are potent reasons for not giv-
ing Section 1782 the extraterritorial effect sought in this case.48 
First, the evident purpose of Section 1782 is to make available to 
foreign and international tribunals and litigants evidence to be obtained 
in the United States. Thus, a harmonious scheme is established: Evi-
dence in Spain is obtained through proceedings in Spain, evidence in 
Great Britian is obtained through proceedings in Great Britain, and evi-
dence in the United States is obtained through proceedings in the United 
States. 
Second, Section 1782 was not intended to enable litigants to obtain 
in Spain evidence located in Spain that could not be obtained through 
proceedings in Spain. 49 Section 1782 should not be used to interfere 
with the regular court processes in another country. Furthermore, such 
use would produce its effects haphazardly, because recourse to it would 
be available only to a party that could find a person resident or "found" 
in the United States, which controlled, directly or indirectly, evidence 
located abroad. 
Third, if Section 1782 could be used for this purpose, American 
courts would become clearing houses for requests for information from 
courts and litigants all over the world in search of evidence to be ob-
tained all over the world. And the burden to produce that information 
would be imposed on persons in the United States who have operations 
abroad. With American banks and financial institutions doing business 
all over the world, finding such a person would be relatively simple.50 It 
is no coincidence that most of the cases concerning the production of 
evidence to be produced or to be obtained abroad have involved banks 
doing business in the United States and abroad.51 Federal courts and 
47. In re Sarrio S.A., 1995 WL 598988 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995) rev'd 119 F. 3d 43 (2d 
Cir. 1997). On this case, see Robert H. Smit, The Sarrio Decision, supra note 5. 
48. The analysis that follows is drawn from an expert opinion I submitted in the Sarrio case. 
49. A sharp distinction should be made between recourse to § 1782 to obtain evidence lo-
cated in the United States for use in a proceeding abroad and recourse to § 1782 to obtain evi-
dence located in a foreign country for use in that action. It is the latter situation that was 
addressed in Sarrio. 
50. In fact, since probably all of the major banks in the world can be "found" in the United 
States, it would be most likely that in any proceeding in any foreign country evidence located in 
that country could be sought by recourse to § 1782 if that section were given extraterritorial effect. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. The Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F. 2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119,103 S. Ct. 3086, 77 L. Ed 2d (1348 (1983); United States v. First 
National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 85 S. Ct 520, 13 L. Ed 2d 365 (1965). See further Lorns 
HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1098-1108 (3d ed. 1993). 
11
Smit: American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tr
Published by SURFACE, 1998
12 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 25:1 
American business should not be saddled with such significant burdens 
in the absence of a legislative intent clearly expressed.52 
Fourth, if American courts were to assume the role of clearing 
houses for world-wide information gathering, conflicts with foreign 
countries would inevitably arise. These conflicts have already arisen 
when American courts and litigants seek information abroad for use in 
American courts.53 They would be substantially aggravated if American 
courts were to seek to impose their information gathering procedures, 
generally unknown in foreign countries that do not belong to the family 
of common law systems. It is one thing for American court to insist that 
its procedures be used in aid of American litigation but quite another to 
impose them on actions brought in foreign courts. 
In In re Application of Sarrio S.A., 54 Judge Paterson denied an ap-
plication under Section 1782 made for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
in Spain for use in Spanish proceedings. The Second Circuit, per Judge 
Leval, reversed, but on the ground that the bank that was asked to pro-
duce the evidence did not object to doing so. Noting that "there is rea-
son to think that Congress intended to reach only evidence located 
within the United States" Judge Leval ruled that, since the bank was 
prepared to produce the evidence, it is "unnecessary for us to decide ... 
the geographical reach of Section 1782." Essentially, therefore, the case 
became one involving application of subsection (b) which provides that 
any person within the United States may voluntarily give testimony or 
produce tangible evidence before any person and in any manner accepta-
ble to him. 55 
Of course, even if Section 1782 were read to apply to the situation 
addressed in Sarrio, the court asked to compel the production of the 
evidence should, for the reasons detailed above, exercise the discretion 
that Section 1782 indubitably gives it to refuse to comply with the 
request.56 
52. It should be acknowledged that the statutory text does not provide explicitly that § 1782 
has no extraterritorial effect. See Robert H. Smit, The Sarrio Decision, supra note 5. However, 
the statutory text does not preclude the construction advocated here either. In any event, the court 
may use its discretion to reach the same result. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
53. See supra cases cited in note 51. 
54. See supra note 47. 
55. See also infra text accompanying notes 83-86. 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 25, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol25/iss1/2
1998] American Assistance to Litigation 13 
vm. THE EXTENT oF THE RELEv ANcE oF FoREIGN RULEs RELATING 
TO THE PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
Without any warrant or support that can be found in the text of 
Section 1782, some courts have ruled that Section 1782 does not author-
ize production of evidence that cannot be compelled under the law of the 
foreign or international tribunal. 57 It should be stressed that the courts 
that have so ruled have not drawn sharp distinctions between non-dis-
coverability and non-admissibility under foreign law. 58 Whatever the 
criterion used, it should be regarded as irrelevant. Section 1782 does not 
make discoverability or admissibility under foreign law a prerequisite to 
proper recourse to Section 1782, and the court should not seek to render 
less liberal the assistance the legislator so clearly prescribed. Fortu-
nately, the Second Circuit, which is likely to be most frequently ad-
dressed with requests for assistance under Section 1782, has ruled 
discoverability or admissibility under foreign law not to be a general 
prerequisite to assistance under Section 1782. 59 
It should be noted that this does not mean, that a court, asked to 
provide assistance under Section 1782, should never consider non-dis-
coverability or non-admissibility under foreign law. For example, in or-
der to create equality of treatment, an American court, when asked to 
compel production by a litigant before a foreign or international tribunal, 
may condition discovery on that litigant's agreeing to make the same 
extent of discovery available to its opponent. 60 In addition, an American 
court may properly take into account a foreign or international tribunal's 
ruling that the evidence sought should not be produced.61 I have dealt 
with these questions in greater detail in earlier publications. 62 I should 
note, however, that foreign courts are increasingly recognizing that non-
discoverability under their own laws should not preclude recourse to 
Section 1782. Both English and Dutch courts have so ruled. 63 How-
57. See, e.g., Jn re Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); 15. Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 
858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.(Fla.), Nov 08, 1988) (NO. 87-6098); Smit, Recent Developments, supra 
note 5, at 236-38. 
58. On this distinction, see Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at Le. 
59. Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Technologies, Inc., 964 F. 2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992); Foden v. Aldunate, 3 F. 3d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 443 
(1993). 
60. Of course, this requirement can be imposed only on a party, not on witnesses not subject 
to the American court's adjudicatory authority. 
61. This aspect arose in the Enron Litigation, in which the English High Court upheld an 
injunction issued by a lower English court. On this decision, see Enron Corp. v. Amoco Corp., 
Case No. 96-20735 (5th Cir. 1997). 
62. See Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 5 at 236-38. 
63. The leading English case is South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij De 
Zeven Provincien N.V., (1987) 1 App. Cas. 24, in which the House of Lords ruled that the non-
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ever, when a foreign or international tribunal has ruled that production 
of the evidence pursuant to Section 1782 would not be appropriate, an 
American court should heed that ruling and deny the application. 64 
IX. THE INTENDED USE OF THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT 
Section 1782 requires that the evidence be sought "for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign and international tribunal." In two cases, the 
Second Circuit, in other respects a paragon of liberal construction of 
Section 1782, has given the quoted words an unduly limited interpreta-
tion. In the first,65 Judge Friendly reversed a lower court's order ap-
pointing a commissioner to take evidence sought by an Indian inspector 
of taxes. Judge Friendly stressed that the inspector did not come within 
the statutory terms. I have already criticized this decision as paying in-
sufficient attention to the adjudicatory nature of the proceedings before 
the inspector and its disregard of the possible use of the evidence sought 
in proceedings before appellate tribunals.66 In the second case,67 Judge 
Newman, rejecting my views, ruled that Section 1782 is applicable only 
if the foreign proceeding is "imminent, i.e., very likely to occur within a 
brief interval. . . "68 
Fortunately, Judge [now Justice] Ginsburg, writing for the District 
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected an attempt to put an 
unduly constraining construction on Section 1782 by upholding a lower 
court's holding that an English prosecutor could have recourse to Sec-
tion 1782, even though no proceedings before an English court were 
pending, as long as such proceedings were "within reasonable contem-
plation. "69 Indeed, the 1964 revision of Section 1782 deliberately elimi-
nated the requirement that the proceedings in the foreign tribunal be 
"pending." This was done in recognition of the fact that the proper gath-
ering of evidence before a proceeding is commenced may serve the 
wholesome purpose of avoiding litigation altogether. 
discoverability under English law did not stand in the way of an English court's or litigant's 
seeking assistance in the United States under § 1782. A similar decision was rendered by the 
President of the Amsterdam District Court. 
64. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
65. See supra note 21. 
66. See Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 233 
67. In re Request for International Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for the Federal Re-
public of Brazil, 936 F. 2d 702 (2d Cir. 1991 ). 
68. 936 F. 2d. at 703. For additional commentaries on this decision, see authorities cited in 
Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 5, at 234, n 92. 
69. In re Letter of Request From the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom 
(Ward), 879 F. 2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a comment on this case, see Peter D. Troobofs & 
Bradford L. Smith, supra note 5, at 929. I submitted an expert opinion to the same effect in this 
case. 
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x. THE COURT' s DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 1782 
Section 1782 provides that a district court "may" order the produc-
tion of evidence in aid of a proceeding in a foreign or international tribu-
nal. The term "may" was used deliberately to afford the court the 
opportunity of refusing assistance, or conditioning it upon compliance 
with conditions, when this was deemed appropriate. As already indi-
cated, a district court should normally exercise its discretion to refuse 
assistance to a private international arbitral tribunal, unless a request for 
such assistance is approved by the tribunal. 70 In addition, a district court 
should exercise its discretion to ensure that a litigant not obtain a one-
sided advantage from the fortuitous circumstance that relevant evidence 
favorable to that litigant is under the control of a person residing or 
found in the United States.71 And a district court should also use its 
discretion to refuse assistance to compel production of evidence located 
in a foreign country under the control of a person in the United States in 
an action between foreign litigants in a foreign country. 72 
A refusal to grant assistance under Section 1782 may also be based 
on the district court's finding that, in some way, the foreign proceedings 
are unfair or incompatible with domestic notions of propriety. But cau-
tion in that regard is warranted, because American courts should not 
condemn foreign proceedings merely because they are different from 
those conducted in, or unknown to, American courts. 
XI. PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 1782 
Section 1782 provides that the district court may prescribe the pro-
cedure to be followed in the production of the evidence and that, unless 
the court prescribes otherwise, the procedure prescribed by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure shall be followed. Taken literally, Section 
1782 prescribes only the procedure to be followed in taking testimony 
and producing tangible evidence and does not address the procedure to 
be followed in obtaining the order directing the production of the evi-
dence. On reflection, it would have been better to provide that, unless 
the court directs otherwise, all procedures under Section 1782 are to 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41. 
71. It may be argued that a disadvantage of conditioning recourse to § 1782 on making 
discovery available to the opposing party is that it may need an inquiry into what discovery is 
available under foreign law. This argument must fail, because the court can impose the condition, 
regardless of whether foreign law permits the discovery. 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56. 
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conform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That, clearly, was the 
intention of the drafters.73 
The reported cases reflect that, in actual practice, application for 
assistance under Section 1782 are frequently filed ex parte. This may 
result in an order's being issued without notice to either adverse parties 
or contemplated parties in the foreign or international tribunal or to the 
person to whom the order is to be directed. Normally, this will cause no 
substantial harm, since, when the order is brought to the attention of the 
person ordered to produce the evidence, that person can move to vacate 
the order if it has been improperly issued. And that person may also 
inform adverse parties in the foreign or international tribunal of the or-
der's issuance. However, the person against whom the order has been 
issued will then have the burden of filing a motion to vacate the order 
rather than merely oppose the initial application. And that person may, 
but also may not, inform parties adverse to the applicant. 
Since it is an elementary precept of due process that a person on 
whom an obligation is to be judicially imposed should have an opportu-
nity to defend before the obligation is imposed, 74 ex parte applications 
are improper, and adequate notice of the application should be given 
both to the person who is to produce the evidence and to adverse 
parties.75 
In actual practice, courts appear to have overlooked the impropriety 
of recording to ex parte applications, perhaps on the ground that, by the 
time an application to vacate the order is being considered, it would 
involve duplication of time and effort to force the refiling of the original 
application for assistance. But that is not an adequate reason for over-
looking an unconstitutional error. At the least, the court should consider 
assessing costs and attorney's fees against the party that made the origi-
nal application.76 
73. This intention may be found in the statutory text by reading § 1782 as requiring that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply broadly to all steps that are necessary in order to achieve 
the production of the evidence. 
74. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970); 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349 
(1969). 
75. The legal interest of adverse parties to receive notice of the application was underlined 
by Judge Leval, in the Sarria case, who affirmed their standing to oppose recourse to § 1782. In re 
Sarrio S.A., 1995 WL 598988 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995) rev'd 119 F. 3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997). To the 
same effect, In re Letter Rogatory from Justice Court, Montreal, 523 F. 2d 562 (6th Cir. 1975). 
76. The assessment of attorney's fees can be justified on the ground of reckless disregard of 
constitutional guarantees. For support of the notion that violation of constitutional norms provides 
a special argument for assessing attorney's fees, see Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d. 25, 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 315, 569 P. 2d. 1303 (1977). But cf Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 
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It may be questioned whether notification of adverse parties, as dis-
tinguished from the person to whom the order is to be directed, is neces-
sary. After all Subsection (b) of Section 1782 provides that the person 
from whom the evidence is sought may voluntarily produce it, regard-
less of the wishes of adverse parties. Subsection (b ), however, is written 
for the situation in which a person voluntarily, and without a court order, 
produces the evidence. In that case, notice to adverse parties is not re-
quired. 77 But the situation is different when a court order is sought. It 
cannot be denied that the issuance of such an order imposes an obliga-
tion on the person to whom the order is addressed and that compliance 
with that obligation may affect the interests of adverse parties in the 
proceeding before the foreign or international tribunal. That being so, 
the adverse parties should be notified. 78 Such notification may also alle-
viate the burdens of the person from whom the evidence is sought. In 
the generality of cases, that person can rely on the adverse party's con-
testing the application and need not expend the money and effort to con-
test the application itself. 
XII. APPLICABLE PRIVILEGES 
The last sentence of Section 1782(a) provides that a person may not 
be required to produce evidence" in violation of any legally applicable 
privilege." The quoted language is deliberately open-ended. It refers to 
any legally applicable privilege, but does not specify what that privilege 
may be. The drafters wished to leave it to the district court to determine 
which privileges, under pertinent conflict of laws rules, were to be ap-
plied. Whenever a plea of privilege is raised under Section 1782, the 
court must therefore determine which evidence is allegedly shielded 
from disclosure and whether, in applying appropriate choice of law 
rules, there is an applicable privilege rule precluding production of the 
evidence. 79 
In the Sarrio case, Judge Leval did not follow the analysis indicated 
by Section 1782. The evidence of which production was sought were 
documents under the control of the bank in Spain and Great Britain. The 
bank caused these documents to be transported to New York to enable 
the bank's counsel to evaluate whether they should be produced. Judge 
Leval' s analysis focused on whether the evidence was covered by the 
U.S. 240, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975), recognizing, in dictum, that imposition of 
attorney's fees may be proper to punish vexatious conduct. 
77. But it may be required by the procedural or ethical rules prevailing in the foreign or 
international tribunal. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
79. See Smit, International Litigation, supra note 4, at 1033-34. 
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attorney-client privilege under American law. The appropriate analysis 
would have focussed on whether the documents that were located in 
Spain and Great Britain were covered by a privilege extended by Span-
ish or English law. After all, the bank should not be able to bring the 
documents within the reach of an American privilege by bringing them 
to New York. Whether the bank was free to produce the documents 
could therefore have been decided under the law of the place that had 
the most significant relationship to the issue, which would appear to be 
the place where the evidence was located at the time its disclosure was 
sought.so Of course, the prevailing choice of law rule in the United 
States in that American courts apply the law of the forum in determining 
whether the attorney client privilege applies.s1 But in the Sarrio case, 
the claim that the attorney-client privilege stood in the way of produc-
tion could hardly be regarded as serious, since the documents were put 
in the hands of the bank's attorney in New York after their production 
was sought. s2 A more respectable argument would have been that the 
bank was obligated to maintain confidentiality under the agreement with 
its customer. That question had to be decided under the law of the place 
where the relationship was created and existed at the time production 
was sought. If, under the applicable foreign law, the information was 
privileged or covered by an obligation of confidentiality, the district 
court should not order its production. 
XIII. SUBSECTION (B) 
Subsection (b) of Section 1782 provides that any person may vol-
untarily produce evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal. 
Of course, this does not give a person the freedom to produce evidence 
that, under applicable law, it may not produce. s3 Its purpose is to make 
clear that the United States creates no obstacles, such as undue reliance 
on sovereignty, to the voluntary production of evidence.s4 Nor does 
Subsection (b) mean that an interested party may not seek to preclude a 
80. The law of that place might well regard the adverse party as having a protected interest 
in precluding disclosure of confidential information. Significantly, Judge Leval ruled that, under 
American law, the adverse party could not assert the privilege. 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §139 (2) (1971). 
82. If a privilege were recognized in such circumstances, an easy way of frustrating discov-
ery would be to transmit the documents to one's attorney. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
84. Many foreign countries invoke sovereignty as an obstacle to discovery in aid of foreign 
litigation. See Hans Smit, International Cooperation in Litigation: Some Observation on the Role 
of International Law and Reciprocity, 9 NETH. INT'L. L. REv. 137 (1962). 
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person from giving evidence that, under applicable law, the person seek-
ing the evidence is precluded from seeking. 85 
As already indicated, Subsection (b) is not applicable when a dis-
trict court orders the production of evidence pursuant to Subsection (b ), 
for that production cannot properly be regarded as voluntary. 86 
XIV. THE RELATION TO THE HAGUE EVIDENCE 
It might be argued that, in relations with foreign countries that have 
ratified The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in 
Civil or Commercial Matters, that Convention provides the exclusive 
procedures for obtaining evidence in the United States for use in a court 
located in a Convention country. The analogous argument has been ad-
vanced by a number of states that have ratified The Hague Evidence 
Convention when American litigants have tried to obtain evidence lo-
cated in those states. 87 Indeed, it may be regarded as somewhat surpris-
ing that no case has yet been decided in which that argument has been 
advanced. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has ruled that The Hague 
Evidence Convention is not exclusive.88 It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that it will rule similarly when the evidence is to be obtained in 
the United States. 
In any event , The Hague Evidence Convention should not be con-
strued to stand in the way of recourse to Section 1782. The purpose of 
Section 1782 is to provide liberal assistance. It would be anomalous, to 
say the least, if a Convention that purports to facilitate international judi-
cial assistance were construed to impede it. 
XV. CONCLUSION 
All in all, Section 1782 has largely served the purposes for which it 
was enacted. American courts have, upon occasion, given it a more re-
stricted construction than warranted by either its text or the legislative 
85. See supra note 77. See also Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the 
Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 535 (1956). 
86. See supra text accompanying note 55 . 
87. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court of Southern District 
Iowa, 482 U.S . 522, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 96 L. Ed 2d 461 (1987). 
88. However, the Supreme Court stressed the desirability of the district courts' being espe-
cially concerned about the comity due to foreign countries . 
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history, but there appears to be no reason for seriously considering, at 
this time, any statutory amendments. 89 
89. Indeed, the only amendment that might arguably deserve consideration is one that would 
make explicit that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all procedures under § 1782. See 
supra text accompanying note 73. The only amendment made to§ 1782 since enactment of the 
1964 revision consists of addition of the words " ... , including criminal investigations before 
formal accusation." in the first sentence of Subsection (a). This amendment was both unnecessary 
and undesirable: unnecessary, because the leading appellate court decision on the issue had al-
ready held in favor of assistance in such investigations (see supra text accompanying note 73); 
and undesirable, because this unneeded particularization may lead to the argument that other simi-
lar situations are not covered by § 1782 (for an example of such a situation, see supra text accom-
panying notes 21-22). 
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